A High-Throughput Method to Detect Privacy-Sensitive Human Genomic Data by Cogo, Vinicius Vielmo et al.
A High-Throughput Method to Detect
Privacy-Sensitive Human Genomic Data
Vinicius V. Cogo1, Alysson Bessani1, Francisco M. Couto1, and Paulo Verissimo2
1LaSIGE, Faculdade de Ciências, Universidade de Lisboa, Portugal
2SnT, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg
{vvcogo,anbessani,fjcouto}@ciencias.ulisboa.pt, paulo.verissimo@uni.lu
ABSTRACT
Finding the balance between privacy protection and data
sharing is one of the main challenges in managing human
genomic data nowadays. Novel privacy-enhancing technolo-
gies are required to address the known disclosure threats
to personal sensitive genomic data without precluding data
sharing. In this paper, we propose a method that system-
atically detects privacy-sensitive DNA segments coming di-
rectly from an input stream, using as reference a knowl-
edge database of known privacy-sensitive nucleic and amino
acid sequences. We show that adding our detection method
to standard security techniques provides a robust, efficient
privacy-preserving solution that neutralizes threats related
to recently published attacks on genome privacy based on
short tandem repeats, disease-related genes, and genomic
variations. Current global knowledge on human genomes
demonstrates the feasibility of our approach to obtain a com-
prehensive database immediately, which can also evolve au-
tomatically to address future attacks as new privacy-sensitive
sequences are identified. Additionally, we validate that the
detection method can be fitted inline with the NGS—Next
Generation Sequencing—production cycle by using Bloom
filters and scaling out to faster sequencing machines.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.4 [Information Systems Applications]: Miscellaneous;
J.3 [Computer Applications]: Life and Medical Sciences—
Biology and genetics; K.4.1 [Computers and Society]:
Public Policy Issues—Privacy
General Terms
Design; Security; Measurement
©2015. Copyright is held by the owner/author(s). This is the author’s version of the
work. It is posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution. The definitive
Version of Record will be published in Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society
(WPES 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2808138.2808139.
.
1. INTRODUCTION
The increase on sharing human genomic data accelerates
medical breakthroughs, while also augments the risks to the
privacy of sensitive genomic data [14]. Privacy protection
and data sharing are not mutually exclusive. In fact, prop-
erly defending the former impels the latter in short-term and
extends donors’ engagement and trust. A human genome
can uniquely identify its owner and reveal information about
him/her and his/hers relatives, even for some past and fu-
ture generations [1, 27]. Additionally, portions of biological
data may provide hints on individual’s health status with
high confidence levels.
Recent studies introduced new attacks to individuals’ pri-
vacy based on genomic data and other publicly-available in-
formation [16, 18, 28, 34]. They have the objective of non-
consented disclosure of personal information of individuals
from their genomic data, and it can be divided into two
classes: threats leading to re-identify donors of anonymized
DNA sequences, based on genetic genealogy profiling [16];
and threats leading to the inference of private and sensitive
information (e.g., victim’s health status) from (re-)identified
DNA sequences, based on disease-related genes [28] and ge-
nomic variations [18, 34]. These attacks must be efficiently
addressed to avoid a rollback on the trend to share DNA se-
quences, which would hurt genomic studies, or even harden
regulations governing genomic data protection [5].
Detecting privacy-sensitive genomic data as soon as it is
generated is a long-term ambition from the research and
clinical communities [10, 15]. Recent works on privacy-
preserving genome processing have been advocating the par-
titioning of genomic data, but assume this must be done
manually [2] or by a tool out of their scope [20]. To the best
of our knowledge, our work is the first to provide a compre-
hensive privacy-aware detection method that enables users
to implement such partitioning automatically. We propose
a privacy-sensitivity detection scheme composed of:
• algorithmic solutions to retrieve privacy-sensitive nu-
cleic and amino acid sequences automatically, with
parametric and evolving sensitivity;
• a privacy-sensitivity detection architecture to system-
atically recognize privacy-sensitive genomic data from
the source (e.g., sequencing machines).
Conceptually, the detector has a clear mission: given a DNA
segment of predefined size s, detect whether this segment
may contain a known privacy-sensitive information or not
(see Figure 1). It does so based on a database of published
signatures or patterns of privacy-sensitive nucleic and amino
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Figure 1: An overview of the method for detecting
privacy-sensitive genomic data.
acid sequences (a knowledge database). Although concep-
tually simple, this approach meets at least two feasibility
challenges:
(i) Accuracy: how to automatically classify DNA segments
as privacy-sensitive or non-sensitive with high sensitiv-
ity and specificity?
(ii) Performance: how to implement a scalable detection
solution that supports the high-throughput of modern
sequencing machines?
The output from our solution is divided in two subsets:
one with the privacy-sensitive portion of input data and the
other containing the non-sensitive part. We initially foresee
the following scenarios where our detector can be employed,
but others may arise in the future:
• Data segregation: one may store and analyze privacy-
sensitive data in a local, private infrastructure, while
he/she may use external, multi-tenant infrastructures
(e.g., public clouds) to work with the non-sensitive
data.
• Data outsourcing : one may store the whole dataset
in an external, multi-tenant infrastructure—if he/she
applies strong, expensive security premises in the ex-
pectedly smaller privacy-sensitive portion, and applies
more affordable security techniques in the non-sensitive
portion. Additionally, homomorphic encryption could
be used in the smaller privacy-sensitive portion to com-
pute it securely in the external facility.
• Data masking : One may filter out one of the portions.
For example, filtering out the larger non-sensitive por-
tion allows users to store and process only the smaller
privacy-sensitive portion, which is enough for several
important analyses (e.g., personalized medicine).
Note the method we propose addresses the challenge of
systematically detecting privacy-sensitive DNA sequences,
whereas what should be done with the two output subsets
is independent from our work and can have different imple-
mentations according to each use case.
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Figure 2: The percentage of privacy-sensitive se-
quences in entire human genomes considering differ-
ent detector knowledge databases. The most com-
plete data set (All-Together) lead to the detection
of only 11.3% of the sequences as privacy-sensitive.
As a proof of concept of the accuracy and completeness
of our approach, we have built a knowledge database from
known short tandem repeats (small repeated strings), disease-
related genes, and genomic variations currently available in
public databases. Using all this information and being con-
servative about what can be considered private, only 11.3%
of the sequences of a human genome are detected as privacy-
sensitive (see Figure 2).
The originality of our work is in adapting existent en-
terprise privacy-preserving solutions and intrusion detection
techniques to the genomics area, and combining them with
different known privacy-sensitive information to protect in-
dividuals. By identifying the privacy-sensitive sequences us-
ing our solution and protecting them, one neutralizes the ex-
istent threats of re-identifying individuals [16], and of infer-
ring private information about them [18, 28, 34]. Moreover,
by using the large body of knowledge about the privacy sen-
sitivity of human genomes available today, it was possible to
create a reasonably complete privacy detector. Despite this
completeness, the detector knowledge database can be auto-
matically updated to address future attacks as new privacy-
sensitive sequences are identified, making it generic and evolv-
able, i.e., it does not become outdated, since public databases
can be automatically tracked for updates as they evolve.
From the performance viewpoint, we also show that our sys-
tem can withstand the evolution of NGS and scale out.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe our privacy-sensitive detection mecha-
nism, its internal methods to construct a knowledge database,
and the implementation details. Section 3 evaluates and
shows the efficiency of the proposed method, and Section 4
discusses the completeness of the used knowledge databases.
Finally, Sections 5 and 6 present some related work and
concluding remarks regarding our techniques and results,
respectively.
2. THE DETECTION METHOD
The detection of privacy-sensitive genomic sequences is
important both for research and clinical communities. In
this section, we present a mechanism to systematically de-
tect privacy-sensitive genomic sequences and its internal meth-
ods for creating a knowledge database with this type of se-
quences.
2.1 Overview
We propose to enhance the NGS production cycle with
a mechanism that we call DNA-Privacy Detector, which,
taking short DNA sequences as input, automatically de-
cides which ones represent privacy-sensitive information. An
overview of our detector architecture is shown in Figure 1.
The detector decides based on a database of published sig-
natures or patterns of privacy-sensitive nucleic and amino
acid sequences (a knowledge database), and forwards input
DNA sequences alternatively to the privacy-sensitive out-
put or to the non-sensitive one. The knowledge is defined
by statistical heuristics and previous data about a context
or a population. Obtaining the privacy-sensitive sequences
is not trivial since biological databases provide unharmo-
nized formats and interfaces. Additionally, we need to add
all combinations of size s from a sequence to the database,
including all their known DNA flanking sequences and mu-
tations (as explained in the next section). The obtained
sequences are considered privacy-sensitive and must never
be sent to the non-sensitive output stream. Similarly to
the signature lists of computer intrusion detection systems
(IDSs) [9], the knowledge database can be updated as new
patterns are discovered.
Our mechanism can analyze input data sets at any time,
but the most powerful and effective configuration would be
when input sequences come directly from NGS machines as
they are generated. The detector can also be integrated in
the NGS machine to automatically detect privacy-sensitive
sequences and add a marker with this information in the
comment line of a FASTQ entry (the NGS read) [8].
2.2 Privacy-Sensitive Human Genomic Data
Portions of human genomic data are considered privacy-
sensitive when they disclose non-consented personal infor-
mation about an individual. We analyzed recent privacy at-
tacks [16, 18, 28, 34] to obtain the attackers’ main goals and
the threats they exploit. First, attackers’ methods can be
divided in two categories depending on their main goal: ob-
taining the identity of genome donors [16]; or donors’ sensi-
tive personal information (e.g., health-related data) [18, 28,
34]. Second, attacks can be divided in three categories re-
garding the threats they exploit: short tandem repeats [16],
disease-related genes [28]; or genomic variations [18, 34].
The studied attacks use only public data (including genomic
sequences), however they can also be applied to any sequence
obtained from private or external infrastructures.
The next three subsections introduce the threats, describe
how they are exploited by attackers, and explain how our
detection method, with the proper security techniques, pre-
vents them from succeeding. We opted for a very conserva-
tive approach in our solution since we store small sequences
of size s in the knowledge database instead of single nu-
cleotides, and detect them as privacy-sensitive sequences in-
dependently from their positions in the genome. Configuring
the size s and using sequence alignment may interfere on the
conservativeness and accuracy of the method.
2.2.1 Short Tandem Repeats
Short tandem repeats (STRs) are small repeated strings
comprised of A, C, G and T characters. For instance, the
STR called DYS392 is represented by [TAT]n, and an in-
dividual who contains a sequence like cgacTATTATTAT-
TATcgca in his DNA will score 4 for DYS392 in his profile.
Genetic genealogy profiles are employed in forensic identifi-
cation, paternity tests, missing people investigations, among
others. A profile from paternal lineage is a set of counters of
how many times each selected short tandem repeat from the
Y chromosome (Y-STR) appears in an individual’s DNA.
In the United States, a core set of 13 STR markers are
being used to generate a nationwide database for forensic
identification [6], called FBI Combined DNA Index System
(CODIS). Other countries and organizations such as EU,
UK, DE and Interpol also selected their sets of core STR
markers to identify individuals. There are registers of sev-
eral known STRs available in public databases, such as the
STRBase [29] and the TRDB [12]. These databases have
thousands of registered STRs, many more than those few
core STRs. Since STRs can also contain mutations, the re-
spective databases must store all known variations.
Attack.
Gymrek et al. [16] described an attack that re-identifies
participants of the 1000 Genomes project (http://www.1000genomes.
org/) in early 2013. The attack was based on two facts:
surnames are paternally inherited in most human societies;
and so are Y-STRs in male individuals [21]. It had two
goals: obtain the surname of individuals and triangulate
their identity. For surname inference, they profiled Y-STRs
of individuals, queried them in public recreational geneal-
ogy databases and obtained a list of possible surnames for
the profiles in question. Each query contained registers of
about 30 known Y-STRs in this case. Authors queried the
Y-STR profiles in the YSearch (http://www.ysearch.org/) and
the SMGF (http://www.smgf.org/) databases, and recovered
the correct surname in 12% of cases (with 82% of confi-
dence). For triangulating identities, authors combined the
obtained surnames with age and state, which were consid-
ered public information that did not needed to be suppressed
in anonymization processes. A query on U.S. census by year
of birth and state results in 60,000 U.S. males in 50% of
cases. Aggregating the surname to the query shrinks the
result to only 12 males on average. Each surname inference
breached the privacy of nearly 16 individuals. Although the
result of 12% appears to be unimpressive, it means that
from the 1,092 participants of 1000 Genomes project, 131
of them will never recover their privacy, nearly 2,100 par-
ticipant’s relatives had their privacy breached [16], and the
disclosed data will continue available for their descendants.
Solution.
We can protect genomic data against this attack with
our approach by registering information in the knowledge
database about all known Y-STRs, detecting privacy-sensitive
sequences containing them, and segregating them from the
non-sensitive output stream. We aggregate the following in-
formation for each known Y-STR:
1. The STR regular expression, e.g., [TAT]n for DYS392.
2. Minimum and maximum number of repetitions ob-
served so far, e.g., 6-17 (for the above STR).
3. All known mutations of the STR [11].
4. All observed left and right flanking sequences, which
are commonly found either before or after the STR.
E.g., 5’-TAGAGGCAGTCATCGCAGTG-3’ is a primer
sequence observed before DYS392 and
5’-AAGGAATGGGATTGGTAGGTC-3’ after it.
Since an STR is a repetition of a small string, a sequence
can start with each different letter from that small string.
For example, in the case of DYS392 we have three possi-
bilities for base sequences, with strings starting with TAT,
ATT or TTA. Considering sequences with s = 10 base pairs,
any read with this size matching entirely this entry should
be only TATTATTATT, ATTATTATTA or TTATTATTAT,
which we call base sequences. For each known mutation we
have to create the respective base sequences, i.e., three for
each mutation of DYS392. Left and right flanking sequences
are concatenated with each base sequence, creating all pos-
sible combinations, which we call long sequences. Each long
sequence is composed by a left flanking sequence, a base
sequence and a right flanking sequence, that finally gives
place to small sequences of size s (the size of our entries)
created by sliding a window of the same size, which we call
privacy-sensitive sequences.
While attacks based on paternal lineage use only Y-STRs,
a hypothetical attack employing forensic identification meth-
ods may use STRs from all chromosomes, for example, when
comparing the victim’s genome from her blood sample to a
database with identified genomes. Thus, we could also regis-
ter STRs from all chromosomes in the detector’s knowledge
by using the same algorithm as for Y-STRs.
2.2.2 Disease-Related Genes
Some portions of a genome, called exons, are translated
to RNA and subsequently to amino acid sequences, which
finally encode proteins. Proteins provide the functional ele-
ments of a biological system, which can have an important
role in many human diseases. The presence or absence of
specific gene mutations is a tell-tale of the predisposition to
or actual contraction of certain diseases. Masking disease-
related genes is thus a viable approach to protect the privacy
of individuals that had their genomes (re-)identified. This
solution focuses mainly on protecting individuals’ privacy
when they have DNA sequences leaked by unauthorized dis-
closure (for example, through the first attack [16]) to pre-
clude attackers from obtaining extra information about in-
dividuals, namely their health status.
This method is very important in cases where sample
donors consent to analyze or store their genome in exter-
nal infrastructures, but wish to mask or to apply stronger
protection on information about some specific diseases. One
real example is the Dr. Jim Watson’s case. He is a co-
discoverer of the double-helix structure of DNA and his
complete genome was sequenced and published in 2008 [35].
However Dr. Watson requested the retraction of all infor-
mation about the APOE, a gene associated to the Alzheimer
disease, before the public release of his genome.
Attack.
The adversaries, after obtaining an identified genome or
portions of it, may learn additional information about the
victim’s health by using the presence or absence of specific
disease-related genes in it. The attack process is similar
to existent direct-to-consumer health-related genetic profil-
ing [13], which informs about an individual’s probabilities
of contracting a disease or any other gene-related informa-
tion. These tests do not provide diagnosis, but in the wrong
hands, they still may cause harm to a victim’s reputation or
otherwise disadvantage her.
Solution.
Detecting all known disease-related genes is a possible so-
lution after obtaining the complete list of these genes and
their sequences. There are dedicated databases that cor-
relates genes and diseases (e.g., GeneCards [30]). These
databases allow users to retrieve the names of all currently
studied genes, or the few genes related with some specific
disease.
Again, the detector is capable to handle data sets obtained
from any set of genes present on any database, we use the
GeneCards database [30] only as a proof-of-concept. From
the estimate of existing 20k – 25k human genes (the exact
number is not yet know [7]), the GeneCards database cur-
rently contains the name and data about disease correlation
of 19,231 genes. A more conservative approach may detect
all known human genes as privacy-sensitive independent if
they were already correlated to a disease or not. For exam-
ple, one may use the OMIM database (http://omim.org/) to
get the sequences of all known human genes (approximately
23k). In this work, we retrieve the genes from GeneCards,
obtain their accession numbers, and retrieve their sequences
from UniProt [32]. For each gene sequence, we must break
it into smaller sequences of size
s
3
(e.g., 10 amino acids) and
insert them into the knowledge database.
Masking disease-related genes is sensitive to imputation
methods based on linkage disequilibrium between genomic
variations. In 2009, Nyholt et al. [28] described the method
that allowed them to recover Dr. Watson’s masked APOE
status. They respected Dr. Watson’s request for APOE
anonymity in the public manuscript, but the main goal of
the authors was to highlight the challenges concerning the
privacy and the complexities of informed consents. Note the
next method is based on genomic variations, the very same
information type used in Nyholt et al. [28], and thus we will
be able to prevent also that attack from succeeding.
2.2.3 Genomic Variations
Humans are 99.5% genetically similar to one another, how-
ever small portions of the remaining 0.5% can uniquely iden-
tify who a DNA belongs to [1]. There are numerous studies
about genomic variations present on individuals. Allele-
frequency analysis [31] roughly identifies how common or
rare the sequence variants of an individual are, in compari-
son to a specific population. Genome-wide association stud-
ies (GWAS) correlate several traits with these genetic vari-
ants common in a population [17].
Attack.
In 2009, Wang et al. showed that it is possible to ac-
quire knowledge about targeted individuals from statistical
results publicly released by GWAS studies [34]. More pre-
cisely, the attacker is assumed to have a blood sample of
the victim and genotyped as few as a couple of hundreds of
her variations, for example, single nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs). Then, the attacker goes on to determine the vic-
tim’s presence in the GWAS’ case group, which indicates
her contraction of a disease. This result extended another
work [18], published one year before, which shows a simi-
lar attack to other common techniques employed in genetic
studies, for example microarrays. Another study [23] states
that obtaining 30 to 80 statistically independent SNP posi-
tions is enough to uniquely identify a single person. Finally,
the study from Nyholt [28] described a genetic imputation
method based on linkage disequilibrium between genomic
variations, which allowed them to infer a masked gene of a
genome by interpreting neighboring variations present on it.
Solution.
Detecting all known genomic variations of an individual is
a feasible approach to prevent such attacks. The knowledge
of all genomic variations (SNPs, indels, substitutions, etc)
within a population is as complete as the allele frequency
(AF) analysis performed in this population. A file in the
Variation Call Format (VCF) contains a table with all vari-
ations resulting from the AF analysis and the occurrence of
them on each individual from the studied population.
We employed the AF analysis of 1000 Genomes project [31],
since it is one of the most important AF studies freely avail-
able on the internet. It contains 39.7 million variations of
1,092 individuals from 14 populations. We employed it as
a significant use case, though it still does not cover 100%
of variations of all those samples [31] – there are several ex-
tremely rare mutations that are yet to be documented. Note
however that our methodology is generic and evolvable: the
detector is again not limited to this specific data set since it
supports any other AF analysis of any population, indepen-
dent of coverage of variations. Additionally, our framework
could be regularly used in biobanks and hospitals, which
could create AF analyses of their private sample collections
and use the resulting data to create the knowledge for the
detector. It is important to remark that the more complete
the sample collection and AF analysis, the better privacy
protection our solution provides.
The knowledge construction in this algorithm starts with
obtaining a VCF file. For each genomic variation present in
this file we extract some data fields about it, for example,
the chromosome and position in which it appears, as well
as the reference and variation alleles. After extracting this
information, we search the chromosome position in the ref-
erence genome used by the AF study and concatenate the
s − 1 left flanking nucleotides with the variation allele and
the s − 1 right flanking neighbors. Finally, we add each
sequence of s base pairs to the knowledge database.
Detecting and protecting all known genomic variations
with this method neutralizes also attacks by genetic imputa-
tion using those variations neighboring the masked genes [28],
as Dr. Watson’s case, allowing the safe use of the previous
method: detecting disease-related genes.
2.3 Implementation
After obtaining the knowledge database of nucleic and
amino acid sequences to the privacy-sensitivity detector, a
second challenge that needs to be addressed is how to imple-
ment this component efficiently and effectively. The techni-
cal challenge is three-fold:
• Questions such as “Is GCTAGCTAGCTAGCGGGGC-
CCTAGCTAGCT privacy-sensitive?” cannot be an-
swered immediately as there is no available data label
or pattern to detect privacy-sensitive DNA sequences,
which differs genomic data from enterprise data (e.g.,
SocialSecurityNumber= 123-45-6789).
• Obtaining the privacy-sensitive sequences is not trivial,
and we need also to lookup large amounts of data—
including DNA flanking regions and all combinations
of size s from a sequence.
• Useful solutions in the genomics area must support the
high throughput of NGS machines and scale out, while
searching input sequences in the whole database (i.e.,
tens of GBs).
We explored several data structures to address the men-
tioned challenges, and Bloom filters [4] presented the most
adequate results. Thus, we use a Bloom filter data struc-
ture to store the knowledge database of privacy-sensitive se-
quences. Bloom filters (BF) are probabilistic space-efficient
data structures that can be used to represent sets in a com-
pact way. In a nutshell, when performing lookups, BFs re-
turn false if an entry definitely does not belong to the set
or true if it probably belongs to the set. Notice that false
positives do not affect the detector’s effectiveness (its pri-
vacy guarantees), only its efficiency (wrongly classifying a
sequence as privacy-sensitive overloads the respective output
stream, vs. the cheaper and more available non-sensitive).
Our knowledge database may contain both nucleic se-
quences (i.e., composed of As, Cs, Gs, and Ts) and amino
acid sequences (i.e., composed of letters from the IUPAC
nomenclature), but lookups in the detector receive only DNA
sequences of size s as input (30 nucleotides in our case). We
first search the original DNA sequence, and if it is not found
in the Bloom filter, then we translate the 30-bp sequence
to the correspondent ten amino acids sequence and lookup
again, returning the respective result. If the knowledge con-
tains only DNA sequences, then we only do the first lookup
and return. If the knowledge contains only amino acid se-
quences, then we directly translate each received DNA se-
quence to the correspondent amino acid sequence, lookup
and return.
An interesting aspect of our Bloom filter implementation
is that, due to the large number of entries in the knowledge
database, we will be using an unconventionally big Bloom
filter, sizing several gigabytes. We chose and improved a BF
implementation called Java-LongFastBloomFilter, which is
a bigger and faster Java solution than most BF implementa-
tions. Bigger because it uses numbers of long type (64-bits)
to index the bit set of BFs, while others still use numbers of
int type (32-bits). This implementation is faster for two rea-
sons. One, it uses a 64-bit Murmur hash, which is one of the
fastest non-cryptographic hash functions with good random
distribution of regular keys. Two, it has an algorithmic opti-
mization that allows reducing (by configuration) the number
of hash keys needed to index an entry by increasing the BF
size up to a configurable size (in terms of percentages). We
modified two aspects from the mentioned BF implementa-
tion: we made the add and contain methods thread-safe,
and added an argument in the constructor to configure the
value considered on the performance optimization.
The source-code of our implementation is available under
the Apache License (v2.0) in GitHub (https://github.com/
vvcogo/dna-privacy-detector) together with additional de-
scriptions for reproducibility on the steps performed to ob-
tain the privacy-sensitive data sets to the knowledge database.
Additionally, the first author may provide the complete data
sets (more than 60GB) used in this paper upon request.
3. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
This section presents results showing that the proposed
detection method is efficient in terms of privacy-sensitivity
of genomes, memory space required for our Bloom filter, and
throughput performance.
3.1 Experimental Setup
The implementations of the previously described meth-
ods, henceforward referred as STR-, Gene-, and VAR-based,
generate different data sets of sequences. The STR-based
method generates two data sets containing sequences of 30
nucleic acids each, namely: the Y-STR and All-STR, which
contain short tandem repeats from Y chromosome and from
all chromosomes respectively. The Gene-based method con-
tains one data set (All-Gene) of sequences composed of ten
amino acids each, where all published disease-related genes
are added to the knowledge database. The VAR-based method
generates one data set (All-VAR) of sequences also com-
posed of 30 nucleic acids each, where it contains all genomic
variations available in the AF analysis of 1000 Genomes
project [31]. Table 1 contains the number of entries from
each data set to the privacy-sensitivity detector, and the re-
spective size as a text-based input file with one entry per
line (considering one byte per character, e.g., UTF-8).
The knowledge data is a set of small sequence entries com-
prised of 30 base pairs or ten amino acids each. The number
of entries in Table 1 can be directly translated to the amount
of storage space needed for them. For example, if each base
pair requires one byte to be stored, the Y-STR data set
would require 1× 30× 0.5× 106 bytes, or 15MB. The Gene-
based would require 1× 10× 8.7× 106 bytes, or 87MB. The
All-Together would require 1× (30× 1169 + 10× 8.7)× 106
bytes, or 35.1GB.
We have randomly selected ten donors identifiers from the
1000 Genomes project, which compose the input data to
our experiments. The resulting donors were those identified
by the numbers NA19788, HG00173, NA20810, HG00339,
HG00619, NA20339, HG00475, HG01390, NA19449, and
NA12546. We describe the steps performed to obtain the
entire genome sequences from these donors in the detector’s
GitHub page. Each input genome of 3GB is the contiguous
genomic sequence in the FASTA format, which is the result-
ing data from assembling a 30× coverage sequencing data
(e.g., FASTQ files with 180GB).
Our experimental environment is one physical machine
that runs all components of our system architecture. This
machine is a Dell PowerEdge R410 server, equipped with two
Intel Xeon E5520 (quad-core, HT, 2.27Ghz), 32GB of RAM
and a hard disk with 146GB (15k RPM). The operating
system is an Ubuntu Server Lucid Lynx (10.04 LTS, 64-
bits), running with a kernel 2.6.32-21-server, and the Java
version is the 1.7.0 25 (64-bits).
3.2 Privacy-Sensitivity of Human Genomes
Our first analysis calculates how much of an assembled
genome is considered privacy-sensitive for each knowledge
data set and false positive rate. We picked the ten men-
tioned genomes to execute the test, where each genome was
split in approximately 103 million sequences of 30-bp each,
the equivalent to 3GB. Figure 3(a) shows the average per-
centages of sensitive entries from these genomes for different
false positive rates in our Bloom filter.
There is a minimal percentage of privacy-sensitive reads
that is independent of the false positive rate of the Bloom
filter, which is in the similar results from probabilities 10−6
to 10−3. It means that one needs to enforce strong security
premises in at least 0.16% (4.8 MB—without compression)
of each assembled genome if using the Y-STR knowledge
database, and in at least 11.3% (345 MB) if the All-Together
data set is used instead. Segregating 11.3% of each human
genome to the privacy-sensitive portion leads to the reduc-
tion of almost 90% of data that must be maintained under
strong security premises. Due to the high similarity in hu-
man genome sequences (more than 99.5%), increasing the
number of input samples will not affect significantly the ob-
tained privacy-sensitive percentage.
3.3 Space Efficiency
This second analysis estimates the size of the knowledge
database in main memory when using the different data sets
from Table 1. Since we use a Bloom filter, theoretically, the
filter size depends only on the expected number of entries
and the expected false positive rate [4]. The expected num-
ber of entries is a constant for each configuration/data set
(from All-Together to Y-STR), which appears in Table 1.
The false positive rate can be defined by the system admin-
istrator to fit the Bloom filter size in the server’s memory
Data set Method Acid type Entry size Number of entries Text file size
Y-STR STR-based Nucleic 30 0.5 M 15MB
All-STR STR-based Nucleic 30 22 M 660MB
All-Gene Gene-based Amino 10 8.7 M 87MB
All-VAR VAR-based Nucleic 30 1,147 M 34.4GB
All-Together All Both 10 and 30 1,178 M 35.1GB
Table 1: The different privacy-sensitive data sets considered in this study. Our partitioning method uses
them as a knowledge database to decide if a DNA segment is privacy-sensitive or not. For each dataset, we
present the approach used to obtain it, the acid type, size and number of entries, and the dataset size when
using a text-based representation.
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Figure 3: (a) The percentage of privacy-sensitive reads for different false positive rates and knowledge data
sets. (b) Bloom filter size for different false positive rates and knowledge data sets. Both axes from (a) and
(b) are in logarithmic scale.
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Figure 4: The throughput of our method using Bloom filters. (a) Considering different false-positive rates
(single-core) and (b) multiple threads (with 0.1% false-positive rate). Both axes from (a) and (b) are in
logarithmic scale.
capacity. Figure 3(b) presents the resulting database size
(in megabytes) based on these two properties.
The Bloom filter size using input from STR- or Gene-
based methods is 50- to 130-fold smaller than the size if
using the VAR-based method. The largest size corresponds
to the use of the largest data set (All-Together) and a false
positive rate of 10−6 (one in a million), which leads to a data
structure as big as 5.6GB. This size easily fits on the main
memory of current commodity servers, and is 6× smaller
than the original size of the entries of this data structure
(35.1GB).
3.4 Throughput Performance
Our final experiment aims at identifying how many base
pairs per second our detector is able to analyze. Figure 4(a)
shows the results considering different false positive rates
in a single core deployment, whereas Figure 4(b) considers
different number of threads in our multi-core system.
As expected, the higher the false positive rate, the higher
the throughput (Figure 4(a)). This happens because higher
rates lead to smaller Bloom filters, which require less hash
operations to test whether or not a sequence belongs to
the set. There is a difference in terms of performance be-
tween methods that use knowledge about nucleic acids and
those that use amino acid sequences as entries. This oc-
curs because we need to translate each 30-bp sequences from
the testing genome to 10-aa sequences when the knowledge
database contains entries composed of amino acids.
Notably, even with our largest and most complete data set
(All-Together with a false positive probability of 10−6), the
detector is still able to analyze more than 13.2 million bp
(i.e., 0.44 million operations) per second with a single core.
Additionally, the detector evaluates 60 million bp (i.e., two
million operations) per second using the other data set of
interest (Y-STR). Considering that high-throughput NGS
machines produce 0.3 million bp/sec [24], our solution works
44× to 200× faster. It means the detector could be inte-
grated directly in NGS machines with the addition of mini-
mal hardware. In this way, the machine could generate dif-
ferent FASTQ files containing either privacy- or non-privacy-
sensitive reads, or, just add one character to the comment
line of the FASTQ entry with its privacy sensitivity.
Obtaining higher throughput is possible when paralleliz-
ing the detection process. Figure 4(b) shows a scalabil-
ity test of up to 32 threads in our test machine, which is
equipped with two quad-core processors with hyper-threading,
i.e., 16 hardware threads. This scalability test considers a
false positive rate of 0.1% (i.e., 10−3), which we consider to
be the sweet spot of our design since it minimizes the BF
size at the same time that it maintains similar percentages
of sensitive reads (see Figures 3(a) and 3(b)). The through-
put scales up to 480 million bp per second when testing
only nucleic acids, up to 110 million for amino acids, and
up to 66 million bp per second when using a knowledge
database with both acids. This corresponds to a speedup
of up to eight times, which is the number of cores in use.
Our solution works 200× to 1600× faster than current high-
throughput NGS machines (0.3 million bp/sec) [24]. There-
fore, the detector is not a bottleneck for current or near-
future machines.
4. COMPLETENESS OF THE METHOD
The approach used in our detection method adapts the
blacklisting from passive knowledge-based intrusion detec-
tion systems (IDS) [9], where network message sequences
are continuously filtered by comparison with entries in a
database of known attack signatures. We refer our knowl-
edge database as a blacklist because it stores all known
privacy-sensitive sequences (dangerous in the sense of IDSs)
that we want to prevent from being sent to the non-sensitive
output stream.
The detector’s effectiveness is complete for all “signatures”
existent in the database, but only for them. Sequences made
vulnerable by new, previously unknown attacks, will not be
recognized without updating the knowledge database, pretty
much like what happens in IDSs with the notorious zero-
day vulnerabilities. In the following, we discuss the risks
and implications of new discoveries related with the three
knowledge sources employed by our technique.
New STR Sequences.
As discussed before, STR is a prime method to iden-
tify individuals in forensic analysis. Our detector uses the
database containing all know STR sequences, but it might
fail to detect a sequence containing a yet to be discovered
STR. To understand the window of vulnerability posed by
newly appeared STRs, we analyzed the annual evolution of
the number of entries in TRDB [12], the main database for
short tandem repeats. From 2003 to 2014, this database
evolved from 237k to 238k STRs. This means that in 11
years, the TRDB registered 1k novel STRs, which represent
a growth of only 0.42% in its entries. This suggests finding
many novel STRs is unlikely, even with the explosive growth
on the number of whole genome studies due to the introduc-
tion of NGS methods. Additionally, the genetic genealogy
databases employed in the re-identification attack [16] use
a static small set of STRs (i.e., few dozens) to profile in-
dividuals. They probably will not increase the number of
profiled STRs since it would require the reanalysis of all
participants. Finally, if an attacker discovers novel STRs,
he will be able to harm victims only after these databases
reanalyze the victim’s DNA or profile victim’s relatives with
the newly identified STRs, which is also unlikely.
New Disease-Related Genes.
The main risk of detecting privacy-sensitive sequences us-
ing the disease-related genes knowledge database is that it
might not identify genes that were not yet linked to some dis-
ease. As with STRs, we also analyzed the annual evolution
on the number of entries in the GeneCards database [30] (the
database we used in this paper to obtain the known disease-
related genes). Our analysis shows an impressive evolution
from 3k disease-related genes in 2005, to more than 19k
in 2014, which corresponds to a growth of 83.3% in nine
years (mostly due to NGS). Given that researchers estimate
that humans have 20–25k genes in their genomes [7], we
have that there are at most 4–23% of genes to be correlated
with diseases yet (and thus are not included in our detector
database). This means that a database such as GeneCards
can only grow up to 25k entries. Additionally, the remaining
genes do not determine alone the contraction of a disease,
may have no relation with any disease, or are related with
rare diseases that affect very few people. Finally, assum-
ing discoveries directly translate into novel privacy-sensitive
sequences is a misconception. Most discoveries correlate
diseases with already known genes and genomic variations,
not new ones. Our method detects a sequence as privacy-
sensitive independently on how many diseases it is correlated
with (one correlation is enough).
New Rare Genomic Variations.
The sequences generated by identifying variations are as
complete as the size and coverage of the population con-
sidered in the allele frequency study over that population.
Currently, there are already countries storing and conduct-
ing studies on the genome of its whole population [19]. A
detector using a database like this will be able to detect
most (if not all) privacy-sensitive sequences, since the VAR-
based detection is by far the method that generates more
entries in our detection database (see Table 1). As the size
and representativeness of the population on the database in-
crease, the detector accuracy increases, accounting for the
exact frequency of a given variant in a population, being
thus capable of detecting any privacy-sensitive sequence.
These discussions suggest that there is already a large
body of knowledge about the privacy sensitiveness of the
human genome. More specifically, it is possible to have a
reasonably complete privacy detector since (1) the rate of dis-
covery of new STRs was extremely low in the last decade—
suggesting we probably know most of them, (2) disease-
related genes are being discovered at an incredible pace—
exhausting the maximum number of human genes, and (3)
rare variations can be accurately covered by increasing pop-
ulation samples in allele frequency studies. This vouches for
the usefulness of an evolvable tool that can be used together
with standard security techniques to dramatically improve
the status quo of robustness of genomic data repositories,
much in the lines of what intrusion detection has achieved
in the protection of IT data servers.
5. RELATED WORK
Detecting privacy-sensitive genomic data as soon as it is
generated is a long-term ambition from the research and
clinical communities [10, 15]. Recent works on privacy-
preserving genome processing have been advocating the par-
titioning of genomic data, but assume this is done manu-
ally [2], or by a tool that is out of their scope [20]. To the
best of our knowledge, the present paper is the first work
implementing an automatic method to this task.
For example, Sedic [20] is a privacy-aware platform that
modifies the Apache Hadoop MapReduce to work in a hybrid
cloud environment. They compute all privacy-sensitive data
in a private cloud or cluster, and the non-sensitive portion in
a public cloud provider. However, they forward the burden
of labeling sensitive data to the user-side, and do not propose
any solution on how to do that in genomic data. Our mech-
anisms can automatically detect and label privacy-sensitive
genomic data, complementing Sedic’s approach and increas-
ing the appeal of their solution.
In another work [2], the authors propose a privacy-preserving
method to process mapped short reads in a scenario of per-
sonalized medicine. They encrypt all genomic data before
storing it, mask a few genomic variations based on donor’s
preferences, and limit the access of medical units to por-
tions of these aligned short reads. There are at least three
main issues of their approach. First, they do not provide
an automatic selection of the genomic variations that will
be masked. Second, they suggest the selection of only a few
variations to be masked, while this protection is insufficient
to preserve donor’s privacy completely [23]. Third, their
masking mechanism roughly filters out the selected genomic
variations, which makes several medical analyses impracti-
cal. Our approach contrasts to theirs since we allow the au-
tomatic detection and masking of all known genomic varia-
tions and many other privacy-sensitive information from hu-
man genomes (e.g., disease-related genes). Furthermore, we
increase the usefulness of data by allowing users to improve
the protection and control of the privacy-sensitive portion
of genomes (e.g., by maintaining it in sites with increased
control and security premises) rather than throwing it away.
Notice that manually marking parts of the genomic data
as private (as in previous works) does not provide any addi-
tional benefit to using our detector. This happens because
our algorithm uses all the knowledge available now and is
insusceptible to false negatives. On the contrary, doing such
classification manually may lead to mistakes and misguided
decisions that may cause leaks on already known privacy-
sensitive genomic data.
6. CONCLUSION
We described a novel efficient solution to detect privacy-
sensitive DNA sequences automatically from an input stream,
using as reference a knowledge database of privacy-sensitive
sequences. The assessment of the privacy-sensitivity detec-
tor demonstrated its feasibility to address the challenges im-
posed by some recently published attacks and to establish
the basis for future developments in this field. More specif-
ically, the idea of having a detection method for privacy-
sensitive DNA is important for four main reasons.
First, the severity of threats to privacy of genomic infor-
mation will be amplified by the explosive growth in DNA
sequences resulting from NGS, bound to be stored and ana-
lyzed in external multi-tenant infrastructures [25]. If little is
done, a severe leak may reverse the public opinion trend to
make DNA sequences public or shareable and hurt genomic
studies, or even harden state laws for genomic data protec-
tion. Researchers have been alerting about the inevitability
of a major leak of genome information in the near future,
and that we should start defining the steps that need to be
taken to avoid a public outcry a genome breach might in-
cite [5]. We believe that the systematic detection, with the
proper protection, of DNA sequences as they are generated
can dramatically reduce the risk of such leaks, and thus is
an important step towards a sound semantic data ecology
by improving privacy protection whilst enabling adequate
mechanisms to promote trusted and secure data sharing [33].
Second, we demonstrated the robustness and high per-
formance of the three methods with which we built the
knowledge database of privacy-sensitive sequences: short
tandem repeats, disease-related genes and genomic varia-
tions present on individuals. These methods were shown to
be enough for avoiding all known attacks we are aware of [16,
18, 28, 34].
Third, our solution is reproducible and evolving: the same
database may be re-used with different data sets, and the
knowledge database can continually and transparently be
updated as new privacy-sensitive sequences are revealed,
without affecting the workflow. In essence, a protection
ecosystem built in accordance to the principles proposed
here would exhibit similar effectiveness as continuously up-
datable industry from the intrusion detection systems.
Finally, we have shown that the privacy-sensitivity detec-
tor can easily be fitted inline with the NGS production cycle
and fulfill the systematic detection promise, exhibiting ad-
equate performance and scalability, by using Bloom filters.
However, we note again that besides the effectiveness of our
solution, the proposed computational framework and archi-
tecture can be reused and evolved with new privacy-sensitive
sequences being identified.
Despite these motivating results, the work presented here
by no means makes standard security methods such as access
control and encryption obsolete, neither does it settle the is-
sue of privacy protection of genomic information. Future
directions encompass further exploring privacy in human
genomes to improve the global knowledge about privacy-
sensitive sequences, exploring cases that might benefit from
the proposed detector method (e.g., hybrid storage using sin-
gle and multi-clouds [3, 26]) and using different techniques
(e.g., text mining [22]) to recognize novel privacy-sensitive
sequences directly from the scientific literature even before
they are added to existing databases.
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